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INVENTORS BEWARE: THE DANGER OF GETTING 
TOO MANY PATENTS 
Daniel Kazhdan & Molly R. Silfen* 
Until recently, conventional wisdom held that getting more patents 
was all upside (aside from the cost of prosecution and maintenance).  
Later patents—even if of questionable validity—could not hurt your ex-
isting portfolio, and, so long as you did not assert your weak patents, 
they would just sit quietly collecting dust.  That conventional wisdom 
was pretty much true. 
Conventional wisdom has not changed, but the reality has.  Because 
of three recent developments, getting continuation patents can now af-
firmatively hurt your whole portfolio—even patents you already have.  
First, with the 2011 passage of the America Invents Act, the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office adopted a strong form of estoppel for post-issu-
ance proceedings.  That estoppel means that, once someone petitions the 
agency for post-issuance review of a patent, the patent owner may have 
no way of avoiding an estoppel-creating judgment on the validity of the 
patent—one that will potentially infect the owner’s other patents.  Sec-
ond, courts have long allowed a patent owner to show that her patent 
would not have been obvious by pointing to various so-called objective 
indicia (such as the commercial success) of a patented product.  For that 
evidence to be meaningful, though, there needs to be a nexus between 
the patent claims and the product.  Recently, the Federal Circuit ruled 
that if the inventor has other patents that claim other, different features 
of the product, those other patents make it harder to show nexus.  Thus, 
getting additional patents might, once again, weaken existing patents.  
Third, in 2014, the Federal Circuit changed the law of double patenting 
and ruled that later-issued patents could shorten the patent-term adjust-
ment of earlier-issued patents.  Therefore, a patent could lose a few 
years of term simply because the patent owner got a continuation patent. 
Following these changes, patent owners should be more judicious 
when they consider applying for additional patents because their later 
applications can potentially damage their whole portfolio. 
 
 * Daniel Kazhdan and Molly R. Silfen are Associate Solicitors at the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of 
the authors and do not reflect the views or opinions of the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A common refrain is, “More is always better.”1  As applied to pa-
tents, this means collect more patents.2  After all, other than the cost of 
getting the patents (which, to be sure, is a real cost), more patents means 
more IP protection.  Right?  Indeed, some have argued that, “for patents, 
the whole” of a patent portfolio consisting of multiple patents “is greater 
than the sum of its parts.”3  In the past, that was pretty much true.  Aside 
from a few exceptional cases, obtaining additional patents could not hurt 
your pre-existing portfolio. 
As this article shows, that is not true anymore.  After providing 
some background on patent prosecution in Section I, this article demon-
strates that three recent legal changes have made it so that getting more 
patents can affirmatively hurt a portfolio—even hurting patents that 
were already issued.  Section II analyzes the most significant change, 
which comes from how the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has im-
plemented the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (the “AIA”).4  
Both before and after the AIA, parties could challenge issued patents in 
the Patent and Trademark Office.  Before the AIA, there were ex parte 
and inter partes reexaminations.5  The AIA left ex parte reexaminations6 
but replaced inter partes reexaminations with three more trial-like pro-
ceedings.7  In implementing the AIA, the Patent and Trademark Office 
promulgated regulations that make it more difficult for patent owners to 
avoid agency trials without an adverse judgment.  Where patent owners 
could get out of reexaminations without an estoppel-creating decision 
by simply disclaiming all the challenged claims,8 AIA trials have no sim-
ilar exit ramp.  Like the pre-AIA reexaminations, if the agency ultimately 
gets to the merits, then that decision can create a binding estoppel.9  AIA 
 
 1. Mean Girls on Broadway, “More Is Better” | Mean Girls on Broadway, YOUTUBE 
(May 17, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3BEj3HyJQGU. 
 2. But see Christopher J. Rourke, Key Strategic Considerations in Obtaining Domestic 
and International Patents in DEVELOPING A PATENT STRATEGY (2013), Westlaw 2013 WL 
571775, at *12 (explaining why failing to focus on the commercial value of individual patents 
in a portfolio can result in high maintenance costs with little financial gain). 
 3. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 
1, 5 (2005) (emphasis added); see also Rourke, supra note 2, at *12. 
 4. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284-341 (2011) 
[hereinafter AIA]. 
 5. 35 U.S.C. §§ 302-307 (2006) (ex parte reexamination); id. at §§ 311-318 (inter partes 
reexamination). 
 6. See id. at §§ 302-307. 
 7. See id. at §§ 311-319 (inter partes review), §§ 321-329 (post-grant review); AIA, 125 
Stat. at 329-31 (covered business method review). 
 8. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 706.03(w) (U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 8th ed. rev. 8, July 2010). 
 9. See id. 
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trials are novel, though, because the implementing regulations leave the 
patent owner with no simple way out: if the patent owner disclaims her 
claims or abandons the proceedings, the Board may enter an adverse 
judgment with binding estoppel effects.10 
Section III discusses the recent shift in the law of nexus.  If a patent 
is challenged as obvious, the patent owner has long been able to point to 
secondary considerations, like the “commercial success” of a claimed 
product, as evidence that the claims would not have been obvious.11  
However, secondary considerations are probative of non-obviousness 
only if there is a “nexus” between the product and the claimed features: 
If, for example, a product is commercially successful due to something 
other than the claimed invention, commercial success is irrelevant.12  Un-
fortunately, “there is rarely a perfect correspondence” between patent 
claims and a commercial product, so it can be difficult to tell whether 
secondary considerations like commercial success are due to the pa-
tented invention.13  A particularly difficult nexus question arises when 
multiple patents cover various aspects of a single product.14  In a recent 
case, the Federal Circuit held that the default is that having multiple pa-
tents that cover the same product cuts against nexus (in a rebuttable way) 
unless the different patents cover “essentially the same invention.”15 
Section IV considers recent changes to the law of obviousness-type 
double patenting.  Historically, a parent application could not lose its 
patent term based on a later-issued continuation application.  Not any-
more.16  Now, a later-filed, later-issued patent might shorten the term of 
its parent.17 
Finally, Section V notes a few long-existing doctrines under which 
an inventor’s later patents have always created potential risks to earlier 
 
 10. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 (2020). 
 11. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966); see also Consol. Safety Valve 
Co. v. Crosby Steam Gauge & Valve Co., 113 U.S. 157, 179 (1885) (making an invention 
“practically valuable” is evidence of non-obviousness). 
 12. Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019); In re 
Caveney, 386 F.2d 917, 923 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 13. Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1374. 
 14. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.05[2][f], at 5-1073-77 (2019) (cit-
ing cases). 
 15. Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1377, 1378; see also Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson 
& Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding no presumption of nexus where there 
was “uncontroverted evidence” demonstrating that the product succeeded because of features 
already present in prior art), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 374 F. App’x 35 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010), reinstated in relevant part, 649 F.3d 1276, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 16. See Abbvie Inc. v. Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology, 764 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014); 
Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 17. See Daniel Kazhdan, Obviousness-Type Double Patenting: Why it Exists and When 
It Applies, 53 AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming June 2019). 
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patents: inequitable conduct, prosecution laches, claim construction, and 
prosecution history estoppel.  However, as the section describes, these 
can be avoided through careful prosecution. 
The upshot is that inventors should be careful before they seek more 
and more patent protection.  Those extra patents can sometimes affirm-
atively hurt the value of a patent portfolio. 
II. HOW PATENTS ARE PROSECUTED 
Patent prosecution is an intricate area of practice,18 but, for our pur-
poses, only a high-level understanding of a few basic points is neces-
sary.19  The process starts when an inventor files an application with the 
Patent and Trademark Office.  There are two kinds of patent applica-
tions: provisional applications and nonprovisional applications.  Only 
nonprovisional applications are relevant for this article. 
An inventor who files a nonprovisional application must include 
both a “specification,” which describes and enables the invention, and 
claims, which particularly and distinctly claim the invention.20  Every 
application receives an effective “filing date.”21  The effective filing date 
is important for several reasons, notably: (1) it defines the prior art that 
can be raised against the patent (prior art has to be prior to the effective 
filing date)22  and, since 1995, (2) the patent expires 20 years after that 
date.23 
An inventor can, if she so chooses, file for multiple patents on the 
same or similar inventions.  There are two ways to do this. 
A. Unrelated applications 
Inventors can file multiple “unrelated” applications: the different 
applications might not even mention one another.  This method of filing 
for patents can create problems for the inventor’s later-filed applications 
depending on certain intricacies of timing.24 
B. Related applications 
The inventor can also file “related” applications, where the later ap-
plications reference and claim certain benefits from the earlier—
 
 18. See generally MPEP. 
 19. Portions of this section are copied from Kazhdan, supra note 17. 
 20. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(2)(A), 112(b) (2012); MPEP § 601 (9th ed. rev. 08.2017, Jan. 
2018). 
 21. 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(4) (2012). 
 22. Id. at § 103; see MPEP § 2141. 
 23. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (Supp. V 2017). 
 24. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012) (providing that an inventor cannot get a patent if, 
for example, the invention was first described in another patent). 
 
294 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:60 
sometimes called the “parent”—application.25  There are three types of 
related applications: (1) continuation applications, (2) divisional appli-
cations, and (3) continuation-in-part applications.26  In all three, the in-
ventor must apply for the “child” application before the parent issues.27  
In continuation and divisional applications, the inventor files for multi-
ple patents using largely the same specification,28 and the inventor can 
claim the filing date of the parent.  In a continuation-in-part application, 
an inventor can add new matter to the specification, but the claims of the 
continuation-in-part application get the benefit of the parent’s filing date 
only if the parent application contains a disclosure that supports those 
claims.29 
There are many reasons an inventor might choose to file multiple 
related applications on the same invention.  The Patent and Trademark 
Office might insist on the inventor dividing her claims,30 the inventor 
might worry that prosecuting all the claims right away would be too ex-
pensive, the inventor might believe that prosecuting the more-ambitious 
claims could hold up the issuance of the less-ambitious ones, the inven-
tor could be trying to game the system, or the inventor might have some 
other reason.31 
III. THE REGULATIONS THAT IMPLEMENT THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT 
HAVE MADE IT EASIER FOR A PETITIONER TO USE ONE WEAK PATENT AS 
A LEVER TO CHALLENGE OTHER PATENTS 
With this background in hand, we can now consider the recent 
changes to patent law.  The AIA made several significant changes to 
patent law.  One was the establishment of AIA trials through which pe-
titioners can aggressively challenge issued patents at the Patent and 
Trademark Office.  Importantly, petitioners choose which patent to tar-
get, so they can start by attacking the weakest one.  As this section 
shows, that ability can be an incredibly powerful tool for taking down a 
whole patent portfolio—not just the weak patents. 
 
 25. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 120–121, 154(a)(2). 
 26. MPEP § 201.02 (9th ed. rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018). 
 27. 35 U.S.C. § 120. 
 28. Id. §§ 201.06, 201.07. 
 29. See MPEP § 201.08 (9th ed. rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018). 
 30. 35 U.S.C. § 121. 
 31. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 
84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 65 (2004) (listing some “pernicious” reasons); see id. at 74-83 (expanding 
on these reasons); id. at 68 (giving less pernicious reasons). 
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A. Controlling the battleground 
A petitioner that manages to invalidate one patent in a portfolio gets 
both de facto and de jure benefits when it later challenges other patents 
in the portfolio. 
1. Atmospherics 
“Specific patterns of timing and sequence matter.”32  Experienced 
litigators know this, and they are thoughtful in choosing the sequence in 
which they present their cases.  Perhaps the best-known example is the 
way Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP (National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People) carefully chose the order of cases in 
which to challenge Plessy’s “separate but equal” standard.33  They 
started by attacking segregation in law schools, moved to graduate 
schools more generally, and, only after they had won those cases, went 
down the educational ladder to public schools.34  As Oona Hathaway 
notes, this was a classic example of “path dependence”: they “pre-
sent[ed] cases in an order that maximized their chances of obtaining the 
legal standard they sought.”35 
Applying this strategy to the patent context, patent owners should 
try to litigate their strongest patent first, while patent challengers should 
try and start with the weakest one.  The party that defines the battle-
ground has a major advantage because it is “strikingly prevalent” for 
courts to follow the result in an earlier patent decision even when they 
are not formally bound to do so.36  Thus, if claims in one patent in a 
family are deemed valid in one tribunal, a later tribunal will likely find 
that to be a meaningful consideration in considering claims in a related 
patent.  The converse is also true: if claims in one patent are found to be 
invalid, a later court is likely to find that claims in a related patent are, 
too. 
 
 32. Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 251 (2000). 
 33. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 34. See, e.g., Constance B. Motley, The Historical Setting of Brown and its Impact on 
the Supreme Court’s Decision, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 9, 11-14 (1992) (citing cases); Wiley A. 
Branton, The Effects of Brown v. Board of Education: A Retrospective View, 23 HOW. L.J. 
125, 129-31 (1980) (similar). 
 35. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in A Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 650 (2001). 
 36. Anthony M. Garza, Collateral Estoppel and Claim Construction Orders: Finality 
Problems and Vacatur Solutions, 6 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005); see id. at 4 
n.11 (citing cases); cf. Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 642 (1936) (finding that, even where 
an earlier decision is not “res adjudicata,” it may, “by comity[,] be given great weight in a 
later litigation and thus persuade the court to render a like decree”), overruled in part by 
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Providence Rubber Co. v. Good-
year37 makes this point almost explicitly.  The Goodyears made a lot of 
money enforcing their patent on rubber—in each case, they were suc-
cessful.38  When they sued Providence Rubber Co., Providence Rubber 
alleged that Goodyear was not the first inventor of rubber.39  The Su-
preme Court began by noting that, despite the “numerous cases of litiga-
tion” that were “earnestly contested,” the Goodyear patent was sustained 
“in every instance.”40  The Supreme Court found this “very persuasive” 
evidence that Goodyear was the first inventor—indeed, the presumption 
was “impregnable.”41  If the patent was invalid, the Supreme Court could 
not “doubt that it would have been overthrown in the numerous and se-
vere assaults which have been made upon it.”42  The Supreme Court then 
reviewed the evidence just to be sure—and it remained convinced that 
Goodyear was the first inventor.43 
A more recent example is Idenix, where both the district court and 
the Federal Circuit ruled that Idenix’s patent did not enable its claim to 
a specific geometry of a compound. 44  In their analyses, both courts 
found it noteworthy that a prior Federal Circuit decision, Storer, had in-
validated a different Idenix patent for failing to enable the compound.45  
No one disputed that Storer was distinguishable from Idenix: As the dis-
trict court recognized, it “involved a different patent, having different 
claims as well as a different specification . . . , the evidentiary record [in 
Idenix was] far more developed than [in Storer], and the legal standard 
applicable [in Idenix] . . . [wa]s far more favorable to Idenix than it was 
[in Storer].”46  Yet both Idenix decisions mentioned Storer because both 
thought it significant that a prior tribunal had invalidated somewhat sim-
ilar patent claims.47 
 
 37. 76 U.S. 788, 793-94 (1869). 
 38. Id. at 793. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 793. 
 41. Id. at 793-94. 
 42. Id. at 794. 
 43. Goodyear, 76 U.S. at 794. 
 44. Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. CV 14-846, 2018 WL 922125 (D. Del. 
Feb. 16, 2018), aff’d in relevant part, 941 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 45. Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1155 n.1. (citing Storer v. Clark, 860 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). 
 46. Idenix, 2018 WL 922125, at *18 n.17; see also Idenix, 941 F.3d at 1155 n.1. 
 47. Of course, this is not a fixed rule, and courts will sometimes not even begin analo-
gizing related patents because they involve “different patents, different specifications, or dif-
ferent claims.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2019); 
see Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 627 (Fed.Cir.1984). 
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2. Res judicata 
When certain conditions are met, path dependence is enshrined in 
the doctrine of res judicata—either claim preclusion or issue preclu-
sion.48  As the Supreme Court has explained, if there is a “final judg-
ment,” then claim preclusion “forecloses ‘successive litigation of the 
very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same 
issues as the earlier suit.’ ” 49  Meanwhile, issue preclusion “bars ‘suc-
cessive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved 
in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,’ even if 
the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.”50  Decisions by ad-
ministrative agencies create res judicata just as much as decisions by 
district courts—unless a statute expressly provides otherwise.51 
Although res judicata certainly applies to patent law, patents are 
something of an awkward fit.  At the threshold, while a patent owner can 
assert the same patent against many different parties, each particular pa-
tent litigation generally involves only two parties—the patent owner and 
one defendant.  For a long time, the Supreme Court held that a patent 
owner whose patent was found invalid against one defendant could still 
assert it against another.52  However, in 1971, the Supreme Court in 
Blonder-Tongue abrogated its prior precedent and ruled that a new de-
fendant could raise estoppel as a defense against a patent that had been 
previously invalidated by another party.53 
Technically, the Supreme Court left the patent owner some room to 
navigate around estoppel.  Before a court could find estoppel, “the pa-
tentee-plaintiff must be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that he did 
not have ‘a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively and evidentially 
to pursue his claim the first time.’ ” 54  The Supreme Court suggested 
some half dozen factors that might cut against a finding of estoppel: 
“choice of forum”; “incentive to litigate”; “whether the first validity de-
termination purported to employ the [proper legal] standards”; whether 
the decision in the first case indicates that “the courts wholly failed to 
grasp the technical subject matter and issues in suit”; and “whether with-
out fault of his own the patentee was deprived of crucial evidence or 
 
 48. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). 
 49. Id. (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001)). 
 50. Id. (quoting New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 748-49); see also B & B Hardware, Inc. v. 
Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 148 (2015). 
 51. See B & B, 575 U.S. at 148; Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 
104, 107-08 (1991). 
 52. Triplett, 297 U.S. at 642. 
 53. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 350. 
 54. Id. at 333 (quoting Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298, 301 (Mass. 
1960)). 
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witnesses in the first litigation.”55  Notwithstanding this multi-factor 
analysis, courts are quick to apply estoppel once an earlier tribunal in-
validates a patent.  Nearly every court to rule on the issue has found that 
a first judgment of invalidity estops the patent owner in later cases.56  
And, over a dissent, the Federal Circuit has recently refused to even wait 
for briefing on the estoppel issue.57  The few exceptions prove the rule: 
There was a case in 1975 where an Ohio court allowed a patent owner 
to relitigate the enforceability of a patent that the Seventh Circuit had 
previously deemed unenforceable.58  Still, the court found the patent un-
enforceable based on the “authority” of the Seventh Circuit case.59  There 
was also a Federal Circuit case that suggested, without deciding, that it 
might be “possible” for a patent owner who settled after losing a first 
case to avoid estoppel in a later case.60  Those two cases are the closest 
courts have come to not applying estoppel. 
The bigger problem with applying res judicata to patent cases is 
how to decide when two cases present the same “claim” or “issue.”61  
This is far murkier.  At least some decisions suggest that everything (the 
claims and the record) must be the same.  Thus, the Federal Circuit like 
its predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sometimes 
allowed an inventor whose patent was invalidated in court to prosecute 
identical claims in a continuation application simply by filing a new af-
fidavit.62  The most famous advocate of this narrow approach to estoppel 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., Soverain Software LLC v. Victoria’s Secret, 778 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015); Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 
Restorative Care of Am. Inc. v. Dickinson, 232 F.3d 909 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Table); Pharmacia 
& Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Mendenhall 
v. Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Mississippi Chem. Corp. v. 
Swift Agr. Chemicals Corp., 717 F.2d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 964, 987 (3d Cir. 1975), amended, 524 F.2d 1154 (3d 
Cir. 1975); Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542, 549 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 57. XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, 890 F.3d 1282, 1294-95 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (over a 
dissent by Judge Newman). 
 58. See Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 1040, 1068 
(S.D. Ohio 1975), aff’d, 562 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1977). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Aqua Marine Supply v. AIM Machining, Inc., 247 F.3d 1216, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (“In a future action, it is possible that Aqua Marine could avoid collateral estoppel by 
arguing that it did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of invalidity.”); cf. 
Hall v. U. S. Fiber & Plastics Corp., 476 F.2d 418, 420-21 (3d Cir. 1973) (refusing to opine 
on the question of estoppel). 
 61. See In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Difficulty sometimes 
arises, however, in delineating the issue on which litigation is, or is not, foreclosed.”). 
 62. See In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that an applicant’s 
new affidavit creates a “new record [that] presents a new issue”); In re Russell, 439 F.2d 1228, 
1230 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Craig, 411 F.2d 1333, 1334 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (overruling prior 
precedent to the contrary). 
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was Justice Clark.  Sitting by designation on the Seventh Circuit (after 
he retired from the Supreme Court),63 Justice Clark ruled that a patent 
owner was estopped from asserting only “explicitly” invalidated claims, 
but the patent owner could still assert similar claims.64  Most courts, 
however, are far more willing to find estoppel,65 and the Federal Cir-
cuit—like the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals—regularly applies 
res judicata even when there are new claims or new evidence.66  At pre-
sent, the Federal Circuit seems to be willing to apply res judicata when-
ever the asserted patent “describe[s] substantially the same invention” as 
the invalidated patent.67 
Whatever clarity there may have been was upended by the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Gunn v. Minton,68 which seems to send res 
judicata back a half century.  In Gunn, the Court addressed the question 
of whether a patent-law malpractice claim must be brought in federal 
court.69  As the Gunn Court noted, legal malpractice is a state-law cause 
of action, so malpractice cases normally go to state court.70  However, 
by statute, state courts have no “jurisdiction [over any claim for relief] 
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents,”71 which might 
suggest that patent-malpractice cases should be decided in federal court.  
In Gunn, the Supreme Court ruled that patent-malpractice cases do not 
have to be litigated in federal courts because they do not present a “sig-
nificant” question that affects the “federal system as a whole.”72  One 
potential issue was that the state court’s decision might be res judicata 
on federal courts for related patents, but the Supreme Court was uncon-
cerned.73  It questioned whether state-court decisions could create 
 
 63. See generally MIMI CLARK GRONLUND, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE TOM C. CLARK: 
A LIFE OF SERVICE (2010). 
 64. Bourns, Inc. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 480 F.2d 123, 124, 126 (7th Cir. 1973). 
 65. Bourns, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 486, 492 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Westwood Chem., 
Inc. v. Molded Fiber Glass Body Co., 498 F.2d 1115, 1117-18 (6th Cir. 1974) (citing Tech-
nograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 484 F.2d 905, 908-09 (7th Cir. 1973)). 
 66. See MPEP § 706.03(w) (citing In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Edger-
ton v. Kingland, 168 F. 2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1947); In re Szwarc, 319 F.2d 277 (C.C.P.A. 1963); 
In re Katz, 467 F.2d 939 (C.C.P.A. 1970)). 
 67. Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps South, LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 
see also MaxLinear, Inc. v. CF CRESPE LLC, 880 F.3d 1373, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (re-
quiring the Board on remand to consider “whether the remaining claims present materially 
different issues that alter the question of patentability”); Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 
F.3d 1327, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (additional views of the panel). 
 68. 568 U.S. 251 (2013). 
 69. Id. at 253. 
 70. Id. at 258. 
 71. 28 U.S.C. § 1338. 
 72. See Gunn, 568 U.S. at 263-65. 
 73. Id. at 262-63. 
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estoppel in a patent case at all.74  Regardless, it held that any estoppel 
“would be limited to the parties and patents that had been before the state 
court.”75 
Everything about this is surprising.  Although not our issue, the Su-
preme Court’s skepticism about estoppel from state court to federal court 
seems to overlook the Full Faith and Credit Act, which requires federal 
courts to give state court decisions the same preclusive effects as the 
state’s courts would.76  If the state-court decision would create estoppel 
in state court, then it should create estoppel in federal court, too.  The 
Supreme Court’s suggestion that estoppel is limited to the “patents” in-
volved in the first litigation, albeit in accord with Justice Clark, is incon-
sistent with most courts.  And the Court’s statement that any preclusion 
would be limited to the specific “parties” litigating the malpractice suit 
is irreconcilable with Blonder-Tongue.77 
* * * * * 
Ultimately, the application of res judicata to patent cases remains 
remarkably complicated.  Correspondingly, the Manual for Patent Ex-
amining Procedure recommends that examiners include other rejections 
along with any res judicata rejection.78  But, whether because of atmos-
pherics or because of res judicata, once one patent claim falls, there is a 
risk of “[a] domino approach in which each successively narrower claim 
is compared with the one before it,” and a whole portfolio can come 
apart.79  Thus, the effects of path dependence can significantly reduce 
the value of a patent portfolio. 
B. Before the America Invents Act, a patent owner could largely keep 
tribunals from ruling on non-asserted patents 
With a few exceptions, before the AIA a patent owner could make 
sure no tribunal issued an estoppel-creating judgment on her weakest 
 
 74. See id. at 263. 
 75. Id. 
 76. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; see also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (“Congress has 
specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments when-
ever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so.”). 
 77. Perhaps to avoid this problem, Professor Gugliuzza reads the Court’s statement as 
just a careless way of getting at the point that a state court’s rulings about a specific case are 
not likely to have broad implications over the state of patent law. See Paul Gugliuzza, Rising 
Confusion About “Arising Under” Jurisdiction in Patent Cases, 69 EMERY L.J. 459, 477 
(2019). As Gugliuzza recognizes, though, many Federal Circuit judges read Gunn differently 
than he proposes. See id. at 478-85 (citing cases). 
 78. See MPEP § 706.03(w). 
 79. See Bourns, 537 F.2d at 493 (criticizing this as “inappropriate”); In re Lundberg, 280 
F.2d 865, 867 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (ruling that this is proper); see generally CHISUM, supra note 
14, § 11.03[5][d] (noting that courts are split on the issue). 
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patents.  There were three primary ways that a non-asserted patent could 
be dragged into litigation: (i) interferences, (ii) reexaminations, and 
(iii) declaratory judgments. However, all three were of limited effect. 
1. Interferences created significant estoppel but were rare 
Before the AIA, the United States granted patents to the first person 
to invent something.80  As a result, if two people applied for patents on 
essentially the same invention, the Patent and Trademark Office needed 
to decide who came up with the invention first.  These disputes were 
resolved in a proceeding called an “interference,” and interferences have 
been around since 1793.81  Initially, interferences went to an arbitration 
panel,82 but later, Congress created a special board within the Patent and 
Trademark Office—today called the Patent Trial and Appeal Board83—
that was tasked with resolving interferences.84  Although interferences 
were fundamentally about who invented first, once the Office declared 
an interference, the Board could decide any question of “patentability.”85 
Board interference decisions came with significant estoppel effects.  
At least by regulation (and maybe even by res judicata), Board judg-
ments disposed of “all” issues that were or “could have properly been” 
raised and decided in the interference.86  Moreover, once the Patent and 
Trademark Office declared an interference (assuming it did not later re-
consider that decision), there was no avoiding a final judgment.  If the 
parties litigated the interference to a final Board decision on the merits, 
the decision would, naturally, create estoppel.87  But a party could not 
avoid estoppel by withdrawing from the interference: a request to with-
draw was treated as a “[r]equest for adverse judgment”88 that precluded 
 
 80. Thus the pre-AIA Patent Act had a complicated interference process to determine 
“priority of the invention[],” which has since been abolished. See 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2006); 
Storer v. Clark, 860 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (The AIA “abolished the first-to-invent 
interference rule in favor of a first-to-file rule.”). 
 81. See 1 Stat. 318, 322-23 (Feb. 21, 1793). 
 82. See id. 
 83. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012). 
 84. See 5 Stat. 117, 123 (July 4, 1836); 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2006). 
 85. 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2006). 
 86. 37 C.F.R. § 41.127(a) (2009). This included claims that could have been brought into 
the interference even if they were not. See Ex parte Kimura, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1537 (B.P.A.I. 
2000). 
 87. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.127(a) (2009); see Ex parte Deckler, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1872 
(B.P.A.I. 1991); Ex parte Tytgat, 225 U.S.P.Q. 907 (Bd. App. 1985); Charles L. Gholz, A 
Critique of Recent Opinions of the Federal Circuit in Patent Interferences, 75 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 448, 475-76 (1993). 
 88. 37 C.F.R. § 41.127(b) (2009). Many parties tried to get out of interferences without 
a judgment, but they all failed. See, e.g., Omura v. Shafer, 417 F. App’x 960 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 
Guinn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Cameron, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1863 (B.P.A.I. 2001). 
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the losing party from asserting or prosecuting claims that were patenta-
bly indistinct from—meaning, claims that would have been obvious 
based on—the adjudged claims.89 
Although, doctrinally, interference estoppel was severe, it had a rel-
atively small effect simply because interferences themselves were rare.  
In the last few years before the AIA was enacted, there were only about 
50 to 60 interferences a year—amounting to approximately 0.01% of all 
applications.90 
2. Reexaminations were common, but parties could avoid estoppel 
Until 1980, only federal courts could decide whether an issued pa-
tent was valid.  In 1980, Congress created a radical new scheme by which 
the Patent and Trademark Office could reexamine an issued patent,91 and 
this ex parte reexamination exists to this day.92  The process is relatively 
straightforward: a requester files a few papers in the beginning of the 
proceeding challenging an issued patent, and then the reexamination 
continues like a normal patent examination—ex parte.93  Thus, ex parte 
reexamination proceedings “are very similar to regular examination pro-
cedures in patent applications” with the requester having no continuing 
role.94  During ex parte reexamination, the patent owner can amend her 
claims—sometimes cancelling some claims while adding other claims 
that are “substantially identical”95—and, if the patent owner is dissatis-
fied with the examiner’s decision, she can appeal to the Board.96  Ulti-
mately, if the Patent and Trademark Office determines that the claims 
were unpatentable, the Office cancels the claims—and that cancellation 
“extinguishes” any underlying district court suits asserting those 
claims.97 
In 1999, Congress added a new scheme for review: inter partes 
reexamination (not to be confused with the inter partes review created 
 
 89. See In re Deckler, 977 F.2d 1449, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing cases). 
 90. See Legacy Format Statistics Archive, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/statis-
tics/ptabbpai-statistics-archive-page (last visited Dec. 17, 2019); see William Ahmann & Te-
naya Rodewald, Patent Reform: The Impact on Start-ups, 24(1) INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 
3, 4 (2012); Michael R. Hull, Patent Harmonization: Moving to A First-to-File Patent System, 
46 LES NOUVELLES 58 (2011). 
 91. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302 (1982). 
 92. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302 (2012). 
 93. See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2017). 
 94. MPEP § 2209. 
 95. See Target Training Int’l, Ltd. v. Extended Disc N. Am., Inc., 645 F. App’x 1018, 
1023 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 96. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 134 (2017); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 305, 306. 
 97. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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by the AIA).98  Anyone could file a request for inter partes reexamina-
tion.99  Inter partes reexaminations were more adversarial than ex parte 
reexaminations, as the requester remained involved throughout and 
could comment on every patent-owner response.100  Like ex parte reex-
amination, the patent would first go to an examiner for review, but, in 
inter partes reexamination, either party could appeal to the Board from 
an adverse decision.101  In 2011, Congress phased out inter partes reex-
aminations and replaced them with AIA trials.102  Ex parte reexamina-
tions remain. 
Importantly, neither ex parte nor inter partes reexaminations have 
the severe estoppel provisions of interferences,103 so the decision to un-
dertake a reexamination proceeding does not inexorably lead to an es-
toppel-creating judgment.104  If a patent owner expects an adverse reex-
amination decision on one of her weaker patents—say the requester or 
examiner puts forth strong arguments for rejection—the patent owner 
can choose not to appeal or disclaim the involved claims, which would 
allow her to avoid an estoppel-creating Board decision.  The Patent and 
Trademark Office will then issue a reexamination certificate of unpatent-
ability or claim cancellation,105 but—even in that very reexamination—
the patent owner can obtain claims that are “substantially identical.”106  
Thus, while the reexamination may cancel some claims—and extinguish 
causes of action that rely on those specific claims—the reexamination 
does not itself create estoppel for other claims. 
3. Declaratory Judgments create estoppel, but they can be 
avoided 
A party can force non-asserted patents into district court litigation 
by seeking a declaratory judgment.107  Declaratory judgments have res 
judicata effects. 
 
 98. See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2000). 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. § 314(a). 
 101. See id. §§ 134, 315. 
 102. See AIA, 125 Stat. at 285; see infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (discussing 
the three new kinds of trials allowing the PTO to reconsider issued patents). 
 103. The interference estoppel provision of 37 C.F.R. § 41.127 (2009) is in subpart D, and 
the regulations provide that, “An inter partes reexamination proceeding is not a contested case 
subject to subpart D.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.60 (2009). 
 104. See MPEP § 706.03(w). 
 105. See MPEP §§ 2288 (ex parte reexamination), 2688 (inter partes reexamination). 
 106. See Target Training, 645 F. App’x at 1023 (explaining that if the newly added claims 
were found to be “ ‘ substantially identical,’ then dismissal of the original cause of action 
would be inappropriate, as the original claims effectively would have survived reexamina-
tion”). 
 107. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 
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The Achilles heel of declaratory judgment actions, though, is the 
statutory (and constitutional108) requirement for an underlying “case of 
actual controversy.”109  This requirement allows patent owners to avoid 
declaratory judgment actions even more easily than reexaminations.  The 
“case of actual controversy” ceases to exist if the patent owner gives the 
declaratory-judgment plaintiff a covenant not to sue;110 if the patent 
owner “unequivocally disclaim[s] any intent to sue” the declaratory-
judgment plaintiff;111 or if the patent owner dedicates the challenged 
claims to the public.112  In such cases, the case is closed with no decision 
on the validity of the claims. 
To be sure, if the patent owner grants one party a covenant not to 
sue for specific claims, she cannot assert those claims against that party, 
and if she dedicates the claims to the public, she cannot assert those 
claims against anyone.  However, if the patent owner has other patents 
that are stronger, then losing the weaker claims may well be a price 
worth paying to control the patent-litigation battleground, thus avoiding 
the potential domino effect that can come from estoppel. 
C. The AIA makes it much harder to avoid a final, estoppel-creating 
decision 
The AIA “represents the most substantial change to American pa-
tent law since the Patent Act of 1952” and maybe even since 1836.113  
Among other things, the AIA introduced three new kinds of trials that 
allow the Patent and Trademark Office to reconsider issued patents: inter 
partes review (“IPR”),114 post-grant review (“PGR”),115 and covered-
business-method review (“CBM”).116  Like inter partes reexamination, 
IPRs and PGRs are largely available to any party, and IPRs are available 
 
 108. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1937). 
 109. 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 
 110. See generally Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85 (2013); see also Arris Grp., 
Inc. v. British Telecomm. PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 111. Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1358, 1360-
61 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 112. Nat’l Semiconductor Corp. v. Linear Tech. Corp., 703 F. Supp. 845, 850 (N.D. Cal. 
1988). 
 113. N. Scott Pierce, The Effect of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act on Collaborative 
Research, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 133, 133-34 (2012). 
 114. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-319. 
 115. Id. §§ 321-329. 
 116. AIA, § 18, 125 Stat. at 329-31. CBMs are sunsetting and will not be available after 
September 15, 2020. See AIA, § 18(a)(3), 125 Stat. at 330. 
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for any patent.117  (CBMs are more limited in scope.118)  Like reexami-
nation requesters, AIA petitioners do not have to show standing.119  
However, an AIA trial is “more favorable to the challenger than the prior 
reexamination process was.”120  As a result, there are far more petitions 
for IPR than there were for reexamination, so more patents are being 
invalidated in AIA trials than had been in reexamination.121  (Although 
AIA trials have become somewhat more favorable to patent owners in 
the last few years, they continue to be more popular—and to invalidate 
more patents—than reexaminations.122) 
One little-noticed difference between AIA trials and reexamina-
tions concerns estoppel.  The statute itself makes AIA estoppel some-
what broader than inter partes reexamination estoppel—both in terms of 
timing and in terms of the estopped tribunals.123  But the implementing 
regulations go significantly further because they give AIA trials the 
 
 117. Certainly, there are some limitations. Some petitioners are time-barred from seeking 
IPR, no petitioner can petition for an IPR or PGR if they previously brought a district court 
action challenging the patent, and only recently issued patents are susceptible to PGR. See 35 
U.S.C. §§ 315, 321(c). 
 118. See AIA, § 18(a)(1)(B), (E), 125 Stat. at 330. 
 119. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143–44 (2016). 
 120. See Robert Harkins, How the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) is Changing 
Patent Protection and Litigation, INTELL. PROP. LAW, 2013 WL 571334, at *6 (Jan. 2013); 
Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 719, 758-61 
(2016). 
 121. In the 37 years in which ex parte reexamination have existed (since July 1, 1981), 
patent owners lost some or all of their claims in 9,012 reexaminations for an average of just 
under 250 per year. Ex parte Reexamination Historical Statistics, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE 1-2 (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/ex_parte_historical_stats_roll_up.pdf. In the nearly 13 years in which inter partes reex-
amination could be requested (from November 29, 1999, to September 16, 2012), patent own-
ers lost some or all of their claims in 1,369 reexaminations for an average of slightly over 100 
per year. Inter Partes Reexamination Historical Statistics, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE 1 (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/in-
ter_parte_historical_stats_roll_up.pdf. Meanwhile, in the nearly 7 years in which AIA trials 
have existed (since September 16, 2012), patent owners lost some or all their claims in 2,768 
trials for an average of a little under 400 per year. Trial Statistics: IPR, PGR, CBM, U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE 10-11 (Dec. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/Trial_Statistics_20191231.pdf. To be fair, those same documents show 
that the raw percentage of decisions finding claims invalid are lower for AIA trials than reex-
aminations. 
 122. See Daniel F. Klodowski et al., IPR and CBM Statistics for Final Written Decisions 
Issued in December 2019, AIA BLOG (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.finnegan.com/en/in-
sights/blogs/america-invents-act/ipr-and-cbm-statistics-for-final-written-decisions-issued-in-
december-2019.html; Daniel F. Klodowski et al., Special Report – PTAB IPR Stats Over Time 
for Q2 2019, AIA BLOG (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/amer-
ica-invents-act/special-report-ptab-ipr-stats-over-time-for-q2-2019.html. 
 123. See Matthew A. Smith, A Critical Analysis of the Inter Partes review statute, GRAY 
ON CLAIMS 2-6 (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.grayonclaims.com/storage/Critical_Analy-
sis_of_Inter_Partes_Review.pdf. 
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severe interference-estoppel provisions.124  Once a party petitions for in-
ter partes review, the patent owner may not be able to avoid an estoppel-
creating judgment because disclaimer and abandonment are treated as 
requests for adverse judgment.125 
As a result, even the claims of the patent owner that are not involved 
in AIA proceedings become more subject to attack.  Of course, unadju-
dicated claims can be challenged as obvious over the prior art directly 
(just as they could be if there were no AIA trial).  But, once a patent 
owner has lost an AIA trial on some claims, the unadjudicated claims 
can also be attacked through res judicata: “If the differences between the 
unadjudicated patent claims and adjudicated patent claims do not mate-
rially alter the question of invalidity, collateral estoppel applies.”126  This 
type of estoppel certainly applies—and has been applied—to other AIA 
trials.  In one case, the Federal Circuit found certain claims to be invalid 
because they were patentably indistinct from claims in another patent 
that had been invalidated in another IPR.127  In another, the court re-
manded to the Patent and Trademark Office to consider patentable dis-
tinctness over invalidated claims.128 
Two district courts have also considered applying estoppel to dis-
trict court litigation based on patents that had not actually been litigated 
through.129  In both cases, the Patent and Trademark Office instituted an 
IPR, the patent owner requested adverse judgment, and the patent owner 
then asserted other claims from those patents in district court.130  The 
district courts accepted that the patent owner could, theoretically, be es-
topped,131 although both courts found patentable distinctness between 
the claims that were before the Patent and Trademark Office and the 
 
 124. Compare 37 C.F.R. § 41.127 (2009) (interference estoppel), with 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 
(2020) (AIA estoppel); see supra note 103 (showing that interference-type estoppel did not 
apply to reexamination). 
 125. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) (2020). 
 126. MaxLinear, Inc. v. CF CRESPE LLC, 880 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 127. See Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 924 F.3d 1243, 
1252-53 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 128. See MaxLinear, 880 F.3d at 1377. 
 129. See generally Music Choice v. Stingray Digital Grp., No. 2:16-cv-00586 
(JRG)(RSP), 2019 WL 6114688 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2019), adopted 2019 WL 6052412 (E.D. 
Tex. Nov. 15, 2019); Choon’s Design, LLC v. Zenacon, LLC, No. 2:13-CV-13568, 2015 WL 
539441 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 9, 2015). 
 130. See Music Choice, 2019 WL 6114688, at *1; Choon’s Design, 2015 WL 539441, at 
*3-4. 
 131. The district courts are right that res judicata should apply just as much to proceedings 
in the Patent and Trademark Office as to district courts. In B & B Hardware, the Supreme 
Court ruled that trademark decisions by the Patent and Trademark Office create res judicata, 
and that seems legally indistinguishable from AIA trials. See B & B Hardware, 575 U.S. at 
148-49, 160. 
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claims at issue in the district court.132  Although the patent owner ulti-
mately survived the res judicata motions, these situations illustrate the 
risks that a patent owner faces when some patents in their portfolio are 
challenged in the Patent and Trademark Office.  The estoppel pitfall ex-
isted only because of the path dependence that the patent owner had 
sought weaker claims, and those weaker claims were challenged.  If the 
patent owner had received only the stronger claims, they would not have 
had estoppel problems. 
However, a couple of years ago, in Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & 
Nephew, Inc., the Federal Circuit cast doubt on the Patent and Trademark 
Office’s AIA-estoppel regulations.133  The case began when Smith & 
Nephew petitioned for IPR of Arthrex’s patents.134  Before the Board 
could decide whether to institute IPR, Arthrex disclaimed all its involved 
claims while caveating that it was “not requesting an adverse judg-
ment.”135  This caveat notwithstanding, Smith & Nephew argued that the 
disclaimer legally served as a request for adverse judgment that would 
trigger estoppel.136  The Board agreed.  It ruled that it had discretion to 
treat Arthrex’s statutory disclaimer as a request for adverse judgment 
and that it was appropriate to do so in that case.137 
Arthrex appealed the Board’s interpretation of the regulations to 
the Federal Circuit, but it did not argue that the regulations were not au-
thorized by statute.138  The majority, through Judge Dyk, found that the 
Board had properly interpreted the regulations.139  However, the court 
expressly “reserve[d] . . . for another day” the question of whether the 
Patent and Trademark Office had authority to adopt the regulations.140  
Judge O’Malley wrote a concurrence to express her “doubts about 
whether the Director had the authority under 35 U.S.C. § 316 (or any 
other statutory provision) to issue that regulation or whether, if so, the 
regulation was properly promulgated.”141  She was unsure whether it 
 
 132. Music Choice, 2019 WL 6114688, at *2; Choon’s Design, 2015 WL 539441, at *9, 
12, 14, 16, 18. 
 133. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 134. Petition for IPR, Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc., No. IPR2016-00917 
(P.T.A.B. Apr. 19, 2016) (Paper 2). at 1. 
 135. Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response at 1, Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. IPR2016-
00917 (P.T.A.B. July 22, 2016) (Paper 8). 
 136. Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 1-2, Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. IPR2016-00917 (P.T.A.B. 
Aug. 11, 2016) (Paper 10). 
 137. Judgment at 8, Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. IPR2016-00917 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 21, 2016) 
(Paper 12). 
 138. Arthrex, 880 F.3d at 1349 & n.2. 
 139. See id. at 1349-51. 
 140. Id. at 1349; see id. at 1350 (“[B]ecause there has been no challenge to the Board’s 
authority to adopt the rule, we sustain the Board’s reading of the regulation.”). 
 141. Id. at 1351 (O’Malley, J., concurring); see id. at 1351-52. 
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would be appropriate for the Board to issue a final judgment even in an 
instituted IPR after a disclaimer, but the Board’s decision to do so “prior 
to institution” was “particularly” troubling.142  Judge Newman, mean-
while, dissented.143  She agreed that the Board lacked statutory authority 
to issue an estoppel-creating judgment in the case, but she further be-
lieved that the regulations did not allow this either.144 
The Federal Circuit’s doubts in Arthrex notwithstanding, the Board 
continues to apply the regulations as written.  Shortly after Arthrex, one 
Board panel questioned whether adverse judgment is “even . . . allowed” 
based on a pre-institution disclaimer.145  That panel, however, found that 
there were other reasons to deny adverse judgment, so it avoided the is-
sue.146  A more recent panel entered adverse judgment based on a pre-
institution disclaimer—citing the Federal Circuit interpretation of the 
regulations in Arthrex.147  In so doing, the Board pointed to the interfer-
ence context as evidence of the scope of the estoppel.148 
In summary, a defendant can target a patent owner’s weakest pa-
tents through AIA trials, and—if the petitioner receives a favorable judg-
ment, either because the Board rules against the patent owner on the 
merits or because the patent owner’s attempts to avoid the proceeding 
are treated as a request for adverse judgment—the challenger can use 
that judgment to infect the patent owner’s other patents. 
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S RECENT DECISION IN FOX FACTORY 
MAKES IT HARDER FOR PATENT OWNERS TO RELY ON SECONDARY 
CONSIDERATIONS IF THEY HAVE MULTIPLE PATENTS ON AN INVENTION 
A bedrock of patent law is that an inventor is entitled to a patent 
only for a non-obvious invention.149  While this fundamental principle is 
easy to state, it is hard to apply.  Courts cannot go back to the time when 
the invention was developed and ask some hypothetical person of ordi-
nary skill in the art what that person would have done.  Instead, lay 
judges must decide, after the fact, what would have been obvious years 
before.  This potentially invites improper “hindsight” bias150 because 
 
 142. Id. at 1351, 1352. 
 143. Id. at 1352-56 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 144. See Arthrex, Inc., 880 F.3d at 1352-56. 
 145. Commvault Sys., Inc. v. Realtime Data, LLC, No. CBM2017-00061, 2018 WL 
1358433, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 14, 2018). 
 146. See id. (blaming the petitioner for delaying the request for adverse judgment). 
 147. See Google LLC v. Seven Networks, LLC, No. IPR2018-01118, 2019 WL 171672, 
at *2 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 11, 2019). 
 148. See id. at *1. 
 149. 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 150. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966) (quoting Monroe Auto Equip. Co. 
v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406, 412 (6th Cir. 1964)). 
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“[m]any things may seem obvious after they have been made.”151  “[T]o 
guard against slipping into use of hindsight,” courts look to what are 
commonly known as “secondary considerations” or “objective indi-
cia.”152  These factors include the “commercial success enjoyed by de-
vices practicing the patented invention, industry praise for the patented 
invention, copying by others, and the existence of a long-felt but unsat-
isfied need for the invention.”153  However, such secondary considera-
tions are not always meaningful evidence of non-obviousness because 
they may be due to “factors unrelated to patent validity.”154 
For secondary considerations to be probative, they must have a 
“nexus” to the patented invention.155  The burden is generally on the pa-
tent owner to produce evidence that shows that nexus exists,156 but nexus 
is presumed if “the thing (product or method) that is commercially suc-
cessful is the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent.”157 
The law is more complicated in situations where a patent owner 
holds multiple patents on the same or related inventions.  A classic ex-
ample of this type of complication arises with “blocking patents.” A 
blocking patent is a patent that prevents others from trying to improve 
on an existing invention.158  For example, if a drug company holds a 
patent on the active ingredient in a drug, competitors have little incentive 
to experiment with methods for delivering the drug since the blocking 
patent will block them from monetizing any improvement in the deliv-
ery.159  Thus, any commercial success in a follow-on but blocked inven-
tion may be due less to the invention claimed in a later patent and more 
 
 151. Monroe, 332 F.2d at 412. 
 152. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 36). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Richard B. Robbins, Subtests of “Nonobviousness”: A Nontechnical Approach to 
Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1176-77 (1964) (cited in Graham, 383 U.S. at 18); 
see also Consol. Safety Valve Co. v. Crosby Steam Gauge & Valve Co., 113 U.S. 157, 179 
(1885). 
 155. E.g., Apple, 839 F.3d at 1054; In re Caveney, 386 F.2d 917, 923 (C.C.P.A. 1967); 
see also CHISUM, supra note 14, § 5.05[2][f][i] at 5-1066-67 n.64 (citing numerous cases). 
 156. See, e.g., Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Solder Removal Co. v. ITC, 582 F.2d 628, 637 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
 157. Demaco, 851 F.2d at 1392. 
 158. See Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 903 F.3d 1310, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (“A patent has been called a ‘blocking patent’ where practice of a later invention would 
infringe the earlier patent. The existing of such a blocking patent may deter non-owners and 
non-licensees from investing the resources needed to make, develop, and market such a later, 
‘blocked’ invention, because of the risk of infringement liability and associated monetary or 
injunctive remedies.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 740 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 
Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 754 F.3d 952, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. 
USA, Inc. (Merck I), 395 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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to the existence of the blocking patent.160  Different panels of the Federal 
Circuit seem to ascribe different weight to commercial success for a 
product that has a blocking patent.  Some describe it as of “minimal pro-
bative value,”161 but others say blocking patents “do not necessarily de-
tract from evidence of commercial success of a product or process.”162 
The problem of blocking patents is just one example of the more 
general difficulty of assessing nexus for products covered by multiple 
patents.  Until recently, the Federal Circuit did not give clear guidance 
on this question,163 but in Fox Factory Inc. v. SRAM, LLC164 the Federal 
Circuit addressed the issue directly and held that having multiple patents 
cuts against nexus.  The case started with Fox Factory petitioning for 
IPR of one of SRAM’s patents on bicycle chainrings.165  The Board 
found that all of the claimed limitations were disclosed in two prior-art 
references, and it also found that a skilled artisan would have been mo-
tivated to combine the references.166  Nevertheless, the Board upheld the 
patent claims based on various secondary considerations.167 
Fox Factory appealed, and the Federal Circuit remanded because it 
concluded that there may not have been sufficient nexus.168  The court 
explained that the claims were not “coextensive” with the commercial 
chainrings.169  In support, the Federal Circuit noted that SRAM had a 
continuation patent covering chainrings, and the chainrings that SRAM 
sold undisputedly embodied an independent claim of that other patent.170  
Because of that, the court held that no reasonable trier of fact could con-
clude that SRAM’s on-sale “chainrings are the invention claimed by the 
independent claims” at issue.171  SRAM argued that it would be an “ab-
surd situation that multiple continuations on a patent would prohibit a 
presumption of nexus,” but the Federal Circuit ruled that the relationship 
 
 160. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 903 F.3d at 1337 (citing cases). 
 161. Galderma, 737 F.3d at 740-41 (quoting Merck I, 395 F.3d at 1376). 
 162. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc. (Merck II), 874 F.3d 724, 731 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017); see Acorda, 903 F.3d at 1336-39 (discussing the various cases). 
 163. See generally CHISUM, supra note 14, at § 5.05[2][f] at 5-1073-77 (analyzing rele-
vant cases). In Apple Inc. v. ITC, 725 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2013), for example, the 
Federal Circuit noted that Samsung and the ITC argued that Apple could not show nexus 
because “multiple patents cover the iPhone’s touchscreen,” but the court did not explain why 
that argument was unpersuasive. 
 164. Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 165. Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, No. IPR2017-00472, 2018 WL 1889561, at *1 
(P.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 2018), vacated and remanded by Fox Factory, 944 F.3d 1366. 
 166. Id. at *5-7. 
 167. See id. at *13-20. 
 168. Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1380. 
 169. Id. at 1374-78. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 1375. 
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between the patents was irrelevant.172  Rather, the existence of “two pa-
tents” cuts against the presumption of nexus unless “both patents gener-
ally cover the same invention.”173 
Fox Factory demonstrates a significant hazard of seeking multiple 
patents on similar inventions.  Obtaining multiple patents can make it 
harder for the patent owner to show the required nexus between any sec-
ondary considerations of non-obviousness and the claimed invention. 
V. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S RECENT CASE LAW ON OBVIOUSNESS-TYPE 
DOUBLE PATENTING HAS MADE IT SO THAT OBTAINING ADDITIONAL 
PATENTS CAN CAUSE A PATENT OWNER TO LOSE PATENT TERM 
In his article Obviousness-Type Double Patenting: Why it Exists 
and When It Applies, Daniel Kazhdan (one of the authors of this article) 
shows that the Federal Circuit’s recent change to the law on obviousness-
type double patenting creates an additional pitfall for patent owners who 
receive multiple patents on an invention.  Now, a patent owner risks los-
ing patent-term adjustment by getting more patents.174  In this section, 
we summarize Kazhdan’s conclusions. 
A. Patent term before and after the URAA 
For more than two hundred years, a patent expired a particular num-
ber of years after it was issued: Patents issued between 1790 and 1835 
were valid for 14 years from issuance; patents issued between 1836 and 
1860 were valid for 21 years from issuance; and patents issued between 
1861 and 1994 were valid for 17 years from issuance.175  In 1994, Con-
gress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”).176  Under 
the URAA, patents filed in 1995 or later expire 20 years from the pa-
tent’s effective filing date.177 
This change in expiration dates created a potential problem.  Under 
the old scheme (where a patent’s term was set based on the date the pa-
tent issued), the patent owner would get the same number of years of 
exclusivity no matter how long the Patent and Trademark Office took 
examining the patent.  By contrast, under the URAA scheme (where the 
patent’s term is independent of the issue date), if the Patent and Trade-
mark Office takes twenty years to examine a patent, the issued patent 
 
 172. Id. at 1377-78 (quoting SRAM’s brief; citations omitted). 
 173. Id. at 1377. 
 174. See generally Kazhdan, supra note 17. 
 175. Neel U. Sukhatme, Regulatory Monopoly and Differential Pricing in the Market for 
Patents, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1855, 1895 n.146 (2014). 
 176. Pub. L. No. 103-465. 
 177. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (Supp. V 2017). 
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might not have any valid term.  Recognizing this potential problem, Con-
gress required that patent term be adjusted to make up for examination 
delays attributable to the Patent and Trademark Office.178  Thus, the pa-
tent owner would not lose patent term simply because a patent lan-
guished in examination.  Patent-term adjustment is limited to the specific 
patent whose examination was delayed, and related patents continue to 
get their normal term. 
An example may be helpful.  Imagine an inventor applies for a pa-
tent on January 1, 2000, but the Patent and Trademark Office simply 
does not look at her application until 2019.  The Office only gets to is-
suing the application as the ‘000 patent on December 30, 2019.  The term 
of the ‘000 patent would get significant patent-term adjustment to ac-
count for the Patent and Trademark Office delay.  Now, imagine that late 
in 2019 the inventor files a continuation application that claimed the 
same effective filing date as the ‘000 patent and that second application 
promptly issues as the ‘001 patent on December 31, 2019.  The ‘001 pa-
tent would not receive any patent-term adjustment, and it would expire 
the very next day—20 years from its effective filing date.  As a result, 
these two related patents would expire on significantly different dates 
despite claiming the same effective filing date.179 
B. Obviousness-type double patenting and terminal disclaimers 
Sometimes, having different expiration dates for similar patents is 
problematic, and courts have developed the “obviousness-type double 
patenting” doctrine as a means of limiting this type of situation.  By way 
of background, the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting pro-
hibits a patent owner from receiving two patents that claim patentably 
indistinct inventions—generally defined as inventions that would be ob-
vious over one another.180  A patent owner can get around an obvious-
ness-type double patenting rejection by filing a “terminal disclaimer.”  
In a terminal disclaimer, a patent owner disclaims the term of the chal-
lenged patent that would otherwise extend beyond the term of the refer-
ence patent—the patent that is being used as a challenge.181 
Again, an example may help.  The cleanest examples are pre-
URAA,182 and we consider one of those. Imagine an inventor applies for 
 
 178. Id. at § 154(b). 
 179. This was not a URAA-created phenomenon. Indeed, before the URAA, related pa-
tents would always have different expiration dates if they did not issue on the same day—as 
discussed at the conclusion of the next subsection. See infra Sec. IV(c). 
 180. See MPEP § 804(II)(B). 
 181. See MPEP § 1490(VI). 
 182. In re Fallaux, 564 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (explaining that obviousness-
type double patenting is of “limited force” after the URAA). 
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a first patent on January 1, 1960, and then, on January 1, 1965, she files 
a second application for a patentably indistinct invention.  The Patent 
and Trademark Office issues the first application as the ‘002 patent on 
January 1, 1961, and the second as the ‘003 patent on January 1, 1966.  
Without obviousness-type double patenting, both patents would expire 
17 years from filing: the ‘002 patent would expire on January 1, 1978, 
and the ‘003 patent would expire on January 1, 1983.  The problem 
would be that the applicant would get (and the public would lose) five 
years of patent term based on the applicant’s filing for a second patent 
that added little or nothing to the public’s knowledge.  As a result, courts 
would require the applicant to file a terminal disclaimer that disclaimed 
the term of the ‘003 patent that extended beyond the January 1, 1978 
expiration date of the ‘002 patent. In this way, both patents would expire 
on January 1, 1978. 
C. Obviousness-type double patenting after the URAA 
Courts are still working out how obviousness-type double patenting 
works post-URAA.  In most cases, obviousness-type double patenting is 
of “limited force” because two patents that claim similar inventions are 
often related, which means that they will have the same effective filing 
date, and, generally, the same expiration date.183  But not always.  The 
two patents might be unrelated (thus giving them different effective fil-
ing dates), one of the related patents might not claim the earliest possible 
effective filing date, or one of the patents could have patent-term adjust-
ment so that it is set to expire later than the related patent.  Thus, obvi-
ousness-type double patenting lives on.184 
What’s more, the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting 
may be expanding.  Before the URAA, when a patent owner held two 
patents on obvious variations of the same invention, the earlier-issued 
patent could not be challenged for obviousness-type double patenting 
based on the later-issued one—regardless of filing dates.185  However, 
post-URAA, a later-filed, later-issued patent might shorten the term of 
an earlier-filed, earlier-issued patent.  This issue has yet to be finally 
resolved by the courts, but, if true, it can be dangerous to file for contin-
uation patents once an inventor has patent-term adjustment on a parent 
because the child might shorten the term of the parent—what Kazhdan 
 
 183. Id. Terminal disclaimers also require common assignment, see 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1,321(c)(3), but that is beyond the purview of this article. 
 184. Id. at 1318-19. 
 185. Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 197 (1894). 
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calls “patent patricide.”186  This depends on how one synthesizes four 
relatively recent Federal Circuit cases. 
1. Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd.187 
Gilead held two unrelated patents on its Tamiflu® drug product for 
treating influenza.188  It applied for one patent on February 26, 1996, and 
the Patent and Trademark Office issued that as the ‘375 patent on Sep-
tember 14, 1999.189  Gilead applied for the second patent on December 
27, 1996, and that patent issued as the ‘483 patent on June 9, 1998.190  




  Figure 1: Gilead’s prosecution of its patents 
Gilead sued Natco for infringing the later-expiring ‘483 patent.191  
Natco responded that the ‘483 patent was invalid for obviousness-type 
double patenting over the ‘375 patent.192  In a split decision, the Federal 
Circuit agreed.193  The majority, through Judge Chen, ruled that obvi-
ousness-type double patenting was different after the URAA, and a later-
issued but earlier-expiring patent could now serve as an obviousness-
type double patenting reference.194  Gilead presented an unusual fact sce-
nario in that Gilead seems to have “crafted” two unrelated applications 
to extend its patent term, but that gamesmanship does not seem to be the 
basis of the court’s holding.195  Rather, the Gilead decision focuses 
 
 186. See Kazhdan, supra note 17. 
 187. 753 F.3d 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 188. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-10, Gilead Scis. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., No. 
14- (Nov. 26, 2014), available at https://www.pbwt.com/content/uploads/2016/09/Gilead-Pe-
tition-for-Writ-of-Certiorari.pdf. 
 189. Gilead, 753 F.3d at 1210. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 1211. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See id. at 1217 (“an earlier-expiring patent can qualify as an obviousness-type double 
patenting reference for a later-expiring patent under the circumstances”); see also id. (Radar 
J. dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s expansion of “the judicially-created doctrine of 
obviousness-type double patenting”). 
 194. See id. at 1214-17. 
 195. Id. at 1210. 
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almost exclusively on the “expiration” dates of the patents—independent 
of how that came to be.196  If that is right, then a patent owner’s contin-
uation patents could always be a potential obviousness-type double pa-
tenting reference against their parents—even if the continuation was 
filed later and issued later—and standard continuation patents could 
cause patent owners to lose patent-term adjustment.197 
2. AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of 
Rheumatology Trust198 
Soon after Gilead, the Federal Circuit again analyzed obviousness-
type double patenting in the post-URAA context.  The Kennedy Institute 
held two related patents on a treatment for rheumatoid arthritis.199  The 
Institute applied for the first patent, the ‘766 patent, in 1996, and it 
claimed an effective filing date of 1992.200  Thus, the ‘766 patent was set 
to expire 20 years from 1992, i.e., in 2012.201  In 2005, the Institute did 
something unusual: it filed a continuation application, which issued as 
the ‘442 patent, claiming a later effective filing date than its parent.202  
Additionally, the ‘442 patent had 750 days of patent-term adjustment 
and so was set to expire in 2018.203 
 
 196. See id. at 1214-17. 
 197. Cf. Gilead, 753 F.3d at 1218 (Radar J. dissenting) (“With this change, successive 
continuations generally do not result in any additional patent term. Rather, the filing date of 
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motivation behind the doctrine—preventing the effective extension of patent term—is largely 
no longer applicable.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 198. 764 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 199. Id. at 1368. 
 200. Id. at 1369. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See id. at 1370 (explaining that “[t]he ‘442 patent application was filed on September 
12, 2005, and claimed priority to the date of the ‘766 patent was filed: August 1, 1996”). 
 203. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of 
Rheumatology Trust, No. 2013-1545, 2014 WL 808969, at *15 (Feb. 18, 2014). 
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  Figure 2: The Institute’s prosecution of its patents 
AbbVie took a license to the earlier-issued ‘766 patent, but, when 
the ‘442 patent issued, AbbVie refused to pay for a second license and 
sought a declaratory judgment that the ‘442 patent was invalid for obvi-
ousness-type double patenting.204  The Federal Circuit agreed with 
AbbVie that the later patent was invalid for obviousness-type double pa-
tenting.205  (Here, because the ‘442 patent issued later than the ‘766 pa-
tent, the obviousness-type double patenting problem would have existed 
even before the URAA.)  Again, the Federal Circuit focused on the prob-
lem of a “later expiring patent.”206  Although AbbVie involved a some-
what unusual fact pattern where the related applications claimed differ-
ent effective filing dates, the Court suggested in dicta that there would 
be an obviousness-type double patenting problem even in the more typ-
ical situation in which two patents have different expiration dates “due 
to examination delays” that lead to “patent term adjustments.”207  That 
seems to be referring to standard parent/child continuation practice 
where the parent has patent-term adjustment and the child does not.208  
Like Gilead, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in AbbVie suggests that a par-
ent’s patent-term adjustment can be lost based on obviousness-type dou-
ble patenting over a standard continuation.  
However, in two later cases, the Federal Circuit seemed to back-
track. 
 
 204. AbbVie, 764 F.3d at 1370. 
 205. Id. at 1381 (“In sum, we conclude that the ‘442 patent is invalid for obviousness-type 
double patenting in light of the ‘766 patent.”). 
 206. See id. at 1373-74, 80-81. 
 207. See id. at 1373. 
 208. See Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Adjustments, Extensions, Disclaimers, and Continu-
ations: When Do Patent Term Adjustments Make Sense?, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 445, 467-68 
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3. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Breckenridge 
Pharmaceutical Inc.209 
Novartis owned two patents covering the drug Zortress®: the ear-
lier-filed, earlier-issued, pre-URAA ‘772 patent and the related, later-
filed, later-issued, post-URAA ‘990 patent.210  Because of the URAA’s 
change to patent terms, the earlier-filed, earlier-issued ‘772 patent was 
set to expire later.211 
 
  Figure 3: Novartis’s prosecution of its Zortress® patents 
The Federal Circuit, through Judge Chen, ruled that the later-filed, 
later-issued ‘990 patent could not serve as an obviousness-type double 
patenting reference against the ‘772 patent.212  The panel distinguished 
AbbVie and Judge Chen’s own prior Gilead decision on two grounds.  
First, Novartis’s patents involved the “particular situation” of one pre- 
and one post-URAA patent.213  Second, Novartis did not engage in the 
“gamesmanship” of Gilead and AbbVie—where the patent owners 
claimed different effective filing dates for similar inventions.214  
The choice of the justification for distinguishing Breckenridge from 
both Gilead and AbbVie has significant ramifications for a standard con-
tinuation patent.  The first rationale assumes that a patent can be chal-
lenged based on a later-filed, later-issued, earlier-expiring patent.  It just 
carves out a small exception for the now (25 years after the URAA) rare 
situation where there is a mix of pre- and post-URAA patents.  By 
 
 209. 909 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 210. See id. at 1358-59. 
 211. Id. at 1359. 
 212. Id. at 1359, 1367. 
 213. Id. at 1366. 
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contrast, the second rationale turns Gilead and AbbVie into exceptions 
to a broader rule: the default under Breckenridge is that later-issued pa-
tents cannot serve as an obviousness-type double patenting reference, 
with an exception for cases of gamesmanship.215 
4. Novartis AG v. Ezra Ventures LLC.216 
Ezra involves the concept of patent term extension.217  For our pur-
poses, suffice it to note that Ezra is like Breckenridge in that it, too, dis-
tinguishes Gilead and AbbVie as cases of “gamesmanship.”218 
As Kazhdan notes, there is tension in the case law.219  Gilead and 
AbbVie suggest that filing continuation patents can now affirmatively 
hurt previously granted patent-term adjustment, while Breckenridge and 
Ezra seem to back away from this.220  As a result, patent owners now 
potentially risk losing patent-term adjustment on parent patents if they 
obtain continuation patents. 
VI. OTHER WAYS IN WHICH RECEIVING ADDITIONAL PATENTS CAN 
HURT A PORTFOLIO 
Although this article focuses on recent changes in the law, there are 
ways in which obtaining more patents has always had the potential to 
hurt a patent owner’s portfolio. 
A. Inequitable conduct in prosecuting one patent can infect another 
patent 
Patent applicants have an “uncompromising duty” to disclose to the 
Patent and Trademark Office any “facts concerning possible fraud or in-
equitableness” in a patent.221  This duty requires that applicants act with 
the “highest degree of candor and good faith.”222  From 1790 to 1836, 
the Patent Act even included a provision that allowed a defendant to 
move to have a patent repealed if the defendant could show that the pa-
tent was obtained “surreptitiously . . . or upon false suggestion.”223  
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However, Congress removed that provision in 1836, and, for a time, the 
Supreme Court believed inequitable conduct was no longer a valid de-
fense to a suit for patent infringement.224  However, in a series of cases 
from the 1930s and 1940s, the Supreme Court changed course and al-
lowed defendants to raise an equitable defense of unclean hands.225  
A finding of inequitable conduct has “far-reaching conse-
quences”226: a patent applicant’s unclean hands in obtaining one patent 
can render other patents unenforceable.227  Courts have therefore tried to 
cabin the doctrine.228  Defendants need to plead inequitable conduct with 
particularity,229 inequitable conduct requires that the patent applicant act 
with the “specific intent” to deceive the Patent and Trademark Office,230 
and, generally, the inequitable conduct has to be a but-for cause for the 
patent’s issuance (unless there is “affirmative egregious miscon-
duct”).231  The result is that inequitable-conduct defenses are almost 
never successful.232 
As relevant here, if a patent applicant commits inequitable conduct 
while prosecuting a continuation patent, there is a theoretical possibility 
that she will retroactively hurt her other patents.  However, the Federal 
Circuit has suggested that an applicant’s actions in prosecuting a contin-
uation patent should not infect an already issued patent (at least not 
 
 224. Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 788, 797 (1869). 
 225. See, e.g., Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 814-15; Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hart-
ford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1944); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 
290 U.S. 240, 247 (1933); see also Cochran, supra note 223, at 74. 
 226. Therasense v. Becton, Dickinson, and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 227. See Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 809-10 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (analyzing Keystone, 290 U.S. at 245-46; Precision, 324 U.S. at 816, 819); see also 
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287 (“Inequitable conduct . . . diverged from the doctrine of unclean 
hands by adopting a different and more potent remedy—unenforceability of the entire patent 
rather than mere dismissal of the instant suit.”). 
 228. See, e.g., Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (“This court now tightens the standards for 
finding both intent and materiality in order to redirect [the inequitable conduct] doctrine that 
has been overused to the detriment of the public.”). 
 229. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing 
Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 
2003)). 
 230. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290. 
 231. Id. at 1292. 
 232. See Jason Rantanen, Recalibrating Our Empirical Understanding of Inequitable 
Conduct, 3 IP THEORY 98, 110-11 (2013) (explaining that, prior to Therasense, determina-
tions of inequitable conduct “were uncommon,” but since Therasense they have become “even 
more infrequent”); see also Robert D. Swanson, The Exergen and Therasense Effects, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 695, 724 (2014) (finding that, since Exergen and Therasense, “the prevalence 
of inequitable conduct claims has decreased from 17% to 8% of patent cases” and attributing 
this drop to “a decrease [from 23% to 9%] in accused infringers’ success in proving inequita-
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normally);233 and one district court has concluded that, as a matter of 
law, “an otherwise validly issued patent cannot be made unenforceable 
because of inequitable conduct occurring years later in connection with 
the issuance of other patents.”234 
B. Prosecution laches can infect a whole patent family 
Somewhat related to inequitable conduct is the equitable doctrine 
of prosecution laches.235  The Supreme Court has described the doctrine 
as follows: 
Any practice by the inventor and applicant for a patent through 
which he deliberately and without excuse postpones beyond the date 
of the actual invention, the beginning of the term of his monopoly, 
and thus puts off the free public enjoyment of the useful invention, 
is an evasion of the statute and defeats its benevolent aim.236  
The purpose of the doctrine is to discourage applicants from delay-
ing the issuance of patents until the public adopts the claimed technol-
ogy.237  Like inequitable conduct, prosecution laches looks to “all of a 
series of related patents”—and not just the patent at issue238—and, if 
prosecution laches is found to invalidate a patent, related patents can be 
rendered invalid too.239  Thus, this is another way in which continuation 
applications can potentially hurt their already issued parents. 
That said, prosecution laches is invoked only rarely.240  And now 
that patent term is measured from the date the applicant files an applica-
tion rather than the date the patent issues, an applicant’s incentive to 
 
 233. See, e.g., SSIH Equip. S.A. v. ITC, 718 F.2d 365, 378-79 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding 
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Laches in Patent Prosecution and Litigation, 46 IDEA 221, 234-35 (2006). 
 236. Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U.S. 50, 56 (1923); see also Webster Elec. Co. v. 
Splitdorf Elec. Co., 264 U.S. 463, 465-66 (1924). 
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 238. See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found.¸422 F.3d 1378, 
1386 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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including the prosecution history of all of a series of related patents and overall delay” might). 
 240. Lemley & Moore, supra note 31, at 93 (As of the 2004 publication date, “only one 
district court has held that the prosecution laches defense ought to apply, and in that case, the 
delays in prosecution were as long as thirty-nine years.”). 
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delay during prosecution is dramatically lower.241  Thus, the number of 
cases invalidating patents for prosecution laches, which was historically 
already small, is likely to get even smaller. 
C. Statements made in one patent can affect claim construction and 
create prosecution history estoppel for other patents within the family 
When a tribunal is determining whether a patent claim is valid or 
infringed, it sometimes must construe the meaning of a term that is used 
in the claim.242  Many sources inform the meaning of each term, includ-
ing other words in the claims, the specification, and the prosecution his-
tory of the patent or application at issue.243  The hope is to construe the 
term in a way that is consistent with every claim, the specification, and 
the prosecution history.244  
Even aside from a claim term’s technical “meaning,” an applicant’s 
statements during prosecution can estop her from making certain argu-
ments.  Specifically, there is an equitable doctrine of equivalents that 
allows a patent owner to sue a defendant for infringing a patent even if 
he does not literally practice every element recited in the claims so long 
as the differences from the claim are only “insubstantial.”245  Determin-
ing the scope of equivalents can be complicated, but the applicant’s 
statements during the prosecution of an application are an important fac-
tor.  Under the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, a patent owner 
cannot “regain[] through litigation[] coverage of subject matter relin-
quished during prosecution of the application for the patent.”246  So, if 
an applicant overcame a prior-art reference by narrowing an element in 
a claim and the claim then issued, the patent owner generally cannot as-
sert that a product that literally infringes the broader claims but does not 
literally infringe the amended claims is legally equivalent. 
In analyzing claim construction and prosecution history estoppel, 
courts look to more than just the patent at issue.  Statements the applicant 
makes in a related specification or prosecution history—be it a child, 
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(discussing damage caused by submariners because of earlier lack of deadlines). 
 242. See generally Steven C. Carlson, Peter S. Menell, & Matthew D. Powers, Patent 
Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 713 (2010). 
 243. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 244. Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 
1995); Rheox, Inc. v. Entact, Inc., 276 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 245. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 24 (1997) (quoting 
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950)). 
 246. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 734 (2002) 
(quoting Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 
1997)). 
 
322 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:60 
parent, or sibling (i.e., an application that shares a common parent)—are 
all potentially relevant.247  Indeed, even abandoned applications can limit 
the scope of their non-abandoned relatives.248  In effect, anything the ap-
plicant has said during the prosecution of the related applications is fair 
game in interpreting a claim term.  Thus, applicants who file multiple 
related patent applications run the risk of saying something that will later 
undercut the scope of their already issued claims. 
This means that applicants who receive a solid and far-reaching pa-
tent should be careful in prosecuting related applications so that they do 
not accidentally limit the construction of their already issued claims or 
the scope of the equivalents for those claims.  With care, though, the 
patent owner can avoid this problem.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The upshot of this article is simple.  The danger to the public of 
having too many patents is well recognized.249  What has gone unnoticed 
is that getting too many patents can hurt the patent owner herself.  Alt-
hough having multiple patents should, generally, give a patent owner 
broader coverage, there have always been dangers to seeking additional 
patents, and recent law has introduced significantly more risks.  It has 
long been the case that inequitable conduct or undue delay (leading to 
laches) in prosecuting a later patent could infect an earlier-filed patent 
that would, otherwise, be fine.  It has also long been the case that state-
ments an inventor later makes in applying for another patent can limit 
the inventor’s claim coverage under the doctrine of equivalents. 
Recent changes to the law have dramatically increased the risk.  A 
weak patent can make an easy target for an AIA trial—it is hard for a 
patent owner to get out of those—and that trial can then infect stronger, 
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already issued patents.  Additionally, recent case law has made it so that 
a later-filed patent can weaken a patentee’s ability to show that her ear-
lier-issued claims are valid through secondary considerations.  Finally, 
the Federal Circuit’s case law on post-URAA obviousness-type double 
patenting might mean that a later-issued patent can cut short an earlier-
issued patent’s patent-term adjustment.  In sum, caveat inventor. 
 
